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1. INTRODUCTION
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that
sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or
worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.
-Justice Tom C. Clarki
In the United States, a suspect cannot be compelled to be a witness
against himself.2 Citizens have a constitutional right, under the Fifth
Amendment, against self-incrimination.3 Sometimes, for better or worse,
this means that law enforcement is not able to obtain certain types of infor-
mation. One of the very few ways 4 a suspect can communicate to law en-
forcement that he does not want to talk with them is to say, "I want to talk
to a lawyer." A court should be careful when allowing police to get around
this request by allowing continued custodial interrogation after invocation
of the right to counsel.5
Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Edwards v.
Arizona,6 police officers are required to stop custodial interrogation7 when
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, expected May 2013; J.D., magna cum laude, Thomas M.
Cooley Law School, 2012; A.B., University of Michigan, 2008. 1 would like to thank those who partici-
pated in a roundtable discussion of what was a seemingly straightforward evidentiary hearing, but the
intricacies of which later gave inspiration for this article-Washtenaw County Assistant Public Defender
Christopher Renna, Intern Kenneth Lee (J.D., Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 2011), and Intern Mat-
thew Walker (J.D., Michigan State University College of Law, 2011).
1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . .
3 Id.
4 See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92 (1984).
5 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
6451 U.S. 477 (1981 ).
7 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)); Rhode Island v. Innis,
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an accused has unambiguously8 invoked his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel.9 Additionally, according to the Court's decision in New York v.
Quarles,o police officers are permitted to intentionally violate Miranda v.
Arizona" by questioning a suspect in custody prior to administering Miran-
da warningsl2 when an immediate threat to the safety of the public or offic-
ers is present.13
But what happens when a suspect is placed into custody, unambiguously
invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and there is an imminent
threat to the safety of the public or the officers? Are police officers permit-
ted to continue asking the suspect questions to eliminate the threat, or must
they wait until an attorney has been made available? If the officers contin-
ue to interrogate the suspect, and the suspect makes incriminating state-
ments, are the statements admissible at trial? If other evidence is obtained
as the result of the officer's questions, is such evidence also admissible at
trial?
Consider the following fact pattern. 14 A woman claiming to have just
been raped approaches two police officers. She tells them that the individu-
al has just entered a supermarket carrying a handgun. While one officer ra-
dios for backup, the other officer enters the store and sees a man matching
the description offered by the woman. Upon seeing the officer, the suspect
runs toward the back of the store. During his pursuit, the officer loses sight
of the suspect for a moment. The officer regains visual contact and orders
the suspect to stop. After frisking the suspect, the officer finds an empty
shoulder holster and places the suspect in handcuffs.
Without being read his Miranda rights, the suspect tells the officer, "I
want to talk to a lawyer." Before the suspect has the chance to consult with
446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
8 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) ("[T]he suspect must unambiguously request
counsel ... [a] suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a rea-
sonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attor-
ney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers
stop questioning the suspect.").
9 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (1981); see also infra Part I. B.
10 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
11 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
12 See id. at 479 (The Court held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition against self-
incrimination required police officers to administer four specified warnings to a suspect prior to custodi-
al interrogation that he has the right to remain silent, anything he says may be used against him, that he
also has the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning, and that an attorney will be appoint-
ed for him if he cannot afford one.).
13 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-57; see also Part II.C.
14 The fact pattern is based principally on the facts of New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), modi-
fied slightly to incorporate the central issue addressed in this paper.
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an attorney, however, the officer questions the suspect about the location of
the missing gun. Nodding in the direction of some empty cartons, the sus-
pect responds, "The gun is over there." The officer locates the gun, places
the suspect under arrest, and reads him his Miranda rights.
Had the suspect not asked to speak with an attorney, it is undisputed that
the Quarles public safety exception15 would allow both the suspect's state-
ments and the gun to be admissible at trial. However, given the suspect's
invocation prior to custodial interrogation, the following questions persist:
Was the suspect's Fifth Amendment right to counsel violated by the police
officer's continued interrogation about the location of the gun? Are the
suspect's statements about the gun's location admissible at trial? Is the gun
admissible at trial? The Court's rulings in Edwards and Quarles have left
these questions unanswered.16
This article addresses the issue of whether the Quarles public safety ex-
ception applies after a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to coun-
sel.17 Due to the lack of guidance in the Quarles opinion, lower courts have
expressed confusion as to whether the public safety exception applies to
Edwards. Several courts have extended the exception, including the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth8 and Ninth Circuits,19 while some state ap-
pellate courts have declined to do so. 20
Part II of this article provides the requisite background for understanding
Miranda's Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the Edwards rule, and the
Quarles public safety exception. Section II.A of this article lays the foun-
dation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel enunciated in Miranda and
its constitutionality addressed in Dickerson. Section II.B builds off of Mi-
randa's right to counsel by explaining the Edwards rule, which requires po-
lice officers to cease custodial interrogation when a suspect unambiguously
invokes his right to counsel. Section II.C considers the Quarles public safe-
ty exception to Miranda, which allows a police officer to intentionally vio-
late Miranda by questioning a suspect in custody prior to administering Mi-
randa warnings when there is an immediate danger to the public or the
15 Id. at 657-58.
16 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 478-79 (1981) (addressing an arrest where the defendant in-
voked his right to counsel after being Mirandized); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 652 (1984) (ad-
dressing an arrest where no assertion ofthe right to counsel was made).
17 This issue has previously been described as a rather "knotty issue." See Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda
Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant? 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 494 (1998).
18 United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692-93 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1129 (1995).
19 United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1989).
20 See, e.g., People v. Laliberte, 615 N.E.2d 813, 822-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), cert. denied, 622 N.E.2d
1218 (Ill. 1993); People v. Zanini, No. F038571, 2003 WL 103464, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003).
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officers.
Part III of this article addresses the current conflict between courts over
whether the Quarles public safety exception applies to Edwards and divides
the two competing approaches into the Extension Approach and the Non-
Extension Approach. Section III.A analyzes the Extension Approach and
three cases in which courts have extended the exception. Section III.B ana-
lyzes the Non-Extension Approach and two cases in which courts have de-
clined to extend the public safety exception.
Given the Supreme Court's rulings in Edwards and Quarles, Part IV of
this article endorses the view that the public safety exception, as narrowly
constructed, should not be extended to situations where an accused has in-
voked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.21 Thus, adhering to the rule
announced in Edwards, when a court is confronted with this issue, any
statement made after a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to coun-
sel is inadmissible, unless used only for impeachment purposes. This arti-
cle concludes that this approach is not only consistent with current law, but
also is substantiated by public-policy concerns.
11. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE PUBLIC
SAFETY EXCEPTION
A. Miranda's Right to Counsel and Its Constitutionality
Unlike the Sixth Amendment,22 the Fifth Amendment contains no explic-
it language pertaining to a suspect's right to counsel. Under the Sixth
Amendment, a suspect's right to counsel attaches at the commencement of
adversarial judicial proceedings.23 In the late 1950s, some Justices dis-
cussed the existence of the right to counsel prior to a suspect's arraignment
21 Cf M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons from the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 241,271-86 (2002)(an argument in favor of extending the Quarles public safety excep-
tion to situations where a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
23 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1932); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin 501 U.S. 171, 175
(1991) ("[The Sixth Amendment right to counsel] does not attach until a prosecution is commenced,
that is, 'at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. "') (quoting United States v.
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984)); Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) ("[A] crimi-
nal defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and
his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attach-
ment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.").
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or indictment;24 however, it wasn't until 1964 that the Court issued an opin-
ion on whether or not the right to counsel exists prior to the initiation of ad-
versarial judicial criminal proceedings.25
In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court extended the right to counsel to pre-
indictment interrogation.26 According to the Court, when police investiga-
tion has
begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to elic-
iting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an
opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has
been denied "The Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution . . . and that no statement elicited by the police during the
interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial. 2 7
One year after Escobedo, the Court held a conference to consider which
of the 101 Escobedo cases it would choose to clarify the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.28 The Court consolidated four cases on appeal, collectively
referred to as Miranda v. Arizona.29  Instead of clarifying it's opinion in
Escobedo, however, the Court strayed away from the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and shifted its focus to the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against compulsory self-incrimination.o
In Miranda, the Court concluded that when an individual is subjected to
custodial interrogation3l on behalf of the police, the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination32 is jeopardized, and there must be some
24 See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448 (1958) (Douglas, J. dissenting) ("[the] demands of our
civilization expressed in the Due Process Clause require that the accused who wants a counsel should
have one at any time after the moment of arrest."); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959) ("Our
Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel to a man on trial for his life in an orderly courtroom,
presided over by a judge, open to the public, and protected by all the procedural safeguards of the
law. Surely a Constitution which promises that much can vouchsafe no less to the same man under
midnight inquisition in the squad room of a police station.").
25 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479 (1964).
26 Id. at 490-91; see also JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 447 (5th ed. 2010).
27 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91.
28 DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 447 (citing Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Lawm of
Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 863 (1979)).
29 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440 (1966).
30 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI.; see also YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 656-
57 (12th ed. 2008).
31 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444
(Custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way").
32 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against him-
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"procedural safeguards" to protect that privilege.,, To achieve this protec-
tive purpose, the Court held that a suspect must be warned prior to police
interrogation that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any question-
ing if he so desires. 34
The admissibility of any custodial confession is conditioned on warning
the suspect of his Miranda rights;35 the failure to administer Miranda warn-
ings and obtain a waiver of those rights before custodial interrogation gen-
erally requires exclusion of any statements made by the suspect.36
As it pertains to a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the Court
in Miranda acknowledged that "[t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody
interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely
made aware of his privilege [against self-incrimination]."37 Thus, the Court
found that the "need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege
comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to question-
ing, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant
so desires."38 Under Miranda, when a suspect invokes his right to counsel,
police must stop the interrogation until an attorney has been made available
to the suspect and after allowing the suspect the opportunity to speak with
the attorney.39 If a statement is obtained after the suspect's invocation but
without the presence of counsel, the government bears a "heavy burden" to
show that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived both his privi-
lege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel.40
In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act. 4 1 Section 3501 of the Act sought to return the law governing confes-
self .. .. ").
33 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
34 Id. at 479.
35 Jd
36 See id. at 444; see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004).
37 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
38 Id. at 470 ("[t]he presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant subsidiary
functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can miti-
gate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice
coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The
presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the
police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial").
39 Id at 474.
40 Id. at 475.
41 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (1968); see DRESSLER supra note 26, at 462; see also KAMISAR, supra note 30, at
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sions to the traditional "totality-of-the-circumstances" voluntariness test
employed by the Court prior to Miranda. 42 While the Act purported to
overrule Miranda, it sat dormant for nearly three decades.43 Additionally,
the Court proceeded to define the rights announced in Miranda as merely
"prophylactic" and not guaranteed by the Constitution itself.44 Both § 3501
and these "prophylactic" cases placed Miranda's constitutional fate in ques-
tion.45
In Dickerson v. United States,46 the Court confronted § 3501 (along with
the Miranda progeny). In that case, the police failed to inform Defendant
Dickerson of his Miranda rights, and he sought to suppress statements
made during custodial interrogation. 47 The Fourth Circuit, concluding that
Miranda was not a constitutional holding, applied § 3501 and determined
that Dickerson's statements were voluntary.48
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Miranda was a constitutional
decision, which cannot be overruled by a legislative act.4 9 Writing for the
657.
42 18 U.S.C. § 3501 states, in pertinent part:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession .
. shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evi-
dence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the
trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the
trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct
the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circum-
stances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and ar-
raignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2)
whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was
suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew
that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him,
(4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned
and when giving such confession. The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be
taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confes-
sion.
43 See DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 463.
4 4 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-
91 (1993); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07
(1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
In regards to the Court characterizing Miranda as "prophylactic," see also Richard H. W. Maloy, Can a
Rule Be Prophylactic and Yet Constitutional?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2465, 2471-75 (2001).
45 Maloy, supra note 44, at 2466.
46 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). See generally Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five
Years Later: A Close Look at the Majority and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387
(2001).
47 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
48 Jd
49 Id at 444.
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majority, Chief Justice RehnquistOo observed that Miranda, as a "constitu-
tional decision," 51 announced a "constitutional rule." 52 The Court attempted
to reconcile the "prophylactic" line of cases with Miranda's constitutionali-
zation by stating that such cases
illustrate the principle-not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule-but that no
constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a general rule can pos-
sibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it,
and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal
part of constitutional law as the original decision.5 3
While the Dickerson decision has received criticism,54 for purposes of
this article, it is sufficient to understand that Miranda was a constitutional
decision when considering the Edwards rule and the Quarles public safety
exception.
B. The Edwards Rule
In Edwards v. Arizona,55 the Court established a bright-line rule that after
a suspect has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the suspect "is
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further commu-
nication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."56
In that case, Defendant Edwards was arrested and taken to the police sta-
tion, where he was informed of his Miranda rights and subsequently ques-
tioned.57 After finding out that another suspect in custody had implicated
him in the crime, Edwards told the police that "[he] want[ed] an attorney
50 Rehnquist was also the author of Tucker, Barett, and Quarles. For a great strategic explanation for
Chief Justice Rehnquist's behavior in Dickerson, see generally Daniel M. Katz, Institutional Rules, Stra-
tegic Behavior, and the Legacy of Chief Justice William Rehnquist: Setting the Record Straight on Dick-
erson v. United States, 22 J.L & POL. 303 (2006).
51 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
5 2 Id at 437-38.
53 Id. at 441; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda is Not Prophylactic and the
Constitution is Not Perfect, CHAP. L. REV. 579, 586-603 (2007). But see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 445
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
54 See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1071-77 (2001).
55 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
56 Id at 484-85. For clarification on "further communication, exchanges, or conversations," see Ore-
gon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (plurality opinion) (Unlike "inquiries or statements ...
relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship," any inquiry or statement that can "be fairly
said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating
directly or indirectly to the investigation" constitutes initiation for purposes of the Edards rule.).
57 dat 478.
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before making a deal."58 The interrogation ceased and Edwards was taken
to the county jail.59 The next morning, two detectives came to see Ed-
wards.60 Initially, Edwards did not want to talk, but later met with the de-
tectives after the detention officer informed Edwards that "he had" to.6 1
The detectives reread Edwards his Miranda rights, and after agreeing to
talk, Edwards implicated himself in the crime.62
In reversing the Arizona Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court held that when a suspect is subjected to custodial63 interrogation64 and
has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel," the
police must stop questioning until the suspect has the opportunity to meet
with an attorney or unless the suspect reinitiates communication with the
police.65 According to the majority, "Miranda itself indicated that the as-
sertion of the right to counsel was a significant event and that once exer-
cised by the accused, 'the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pre-
sent."' 66 Because Edwards neither met with an attorney nor reinitiated
conversation with the authorities,67 the Court ruled that his statement was
inadmissible.68
Pre-Dickerson, the Court described the Edwards rule as a "second layer
of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel"69 that was "designed to
prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously as-
58 Id at 479.
59 d
60 Jd
61 Jd
62 Jd
63 A person is "in custody" for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings if "there is a 'formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler,
463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
64 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) ("The term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect.")
6 5 Edwtards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
66 Id. at 485 (emphasis added) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)); see Fare v. Mi-
chael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) ("[A]n accused's request for an attorney is per se an invocation of
his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease."); see also Innis, 446 U.S. at 297-98
(citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74).
67 Id at 487.
68 Jd
69 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176
(1991)); see also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 645 (1984) ("The Edwards rule is ... a prophylactic
rule, designed to implement pre-existing rights."); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (The
Edwards rule's prohibition on continued interrogation "is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic pur-
pose.").
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serted Miranda rights."70 To achieve this purpose, the Court has expanded
upon the protection of the rule announced in Edwards, holding that once a
suspect has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, police officers
cannot question the suspect regarding any offense, even if it is unrelated to
the original charge, 71 unless an attorney is actually present.7 2
When faced with an Edwards violation, under the exclusionary rule, a
suspect's answers to an officer's continued custodial interrogation after an
invocation of his right to counsel should not be admitted at trial in the gov-
ernment's case-in-chief;73 however, the Court has held that Miranda viola-
tions do not prevent the government from introducing elicited statements
for impeachment purposes, provided that the statements are not otherwise
involuntary.74 Additionally, in a plurality opinion, the Court has reaffirmed
that "physical fruit of a Miranda violation need not be suppressed."75 Simi-
larly, noncoerced statements are also admissible under the Quarles public
safety exception.76
C. The Quarles Public Safety Exception
Continuing in the post-Miranda and pre-Dickerson "prophylactic" line of
cases, the Court established in New York v. Quarles a "narrow" public safe-
ty exception,77 allowing police officers to intentionally violate Miranda's
requirement that officers administer Miranda warnings prior to custodial
interrogation when there is an immediate danger to the public.78
70 Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)); accord Smith v.
Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984).
71 Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1988)).
72 See id (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990)).
73 See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990).
74 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971); see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723
(1975).
75 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 638 (2004) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J.). But given Dickerson's constitutional "clarification" of Miranda, there is
some debate over whether the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine would hold that physical evidence
obtained as a direct result of the questioning should also be suppressed. See Yale Kamisar, On the For-
tieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It And What Happened to It,
5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 201-03 (2007). Compare. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85
(1963), iwith United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 303-04
(1985).
76 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984). See generally Section II.C.
77 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658.
78 Id. at 655-56; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 n. 10 (1984) (the Supreme Court
further explains the Quarles public safety exception: "When the police arrest a suspect under circum-
stances presenting an imminent danger to the public safety, they may, without informing him of his con-
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In Quarles, a young woman approached two police officers at night,
claiming that a man carrying a gun who recently entered a supermarket had
just raped her.79 While one officer radioed for assistance, the other officer
entered the store and saw an individual who matched the woman's descrip-
tion.80 After seeing the officer, Defendant Quarles quickly ran toward the
rear of the supermarket.81 During the foot pursuit, the officer temporarily
lost sight of Quarles. 82 Upon regaining visual contact, the officer ordered
Quarles to stop.83 The officer frisked Quarles, only to find that Quarles's
shoulder holster was empty. 8 4
After placing him in handcuffs, but before administering Miranda warn-
ings, the officer asked where the missing gun was. 85 Nodding in the direc-
tion of some empty cartons, Quarles responded, "[t]he gun is over there."86
The officer retrieved the gun, placed Quarles under arrest and read him his
Miranda rights.87 Quarles waived his rights, agreed to answer questions
without an attorney present, and admitted owning the gun.88 In relying on
the Court's decision in Miranda, the trial court excluded both the statement
"the gun is over there" and the gun because of the officer's failure to read
Quarles his Miranda rights.89 The lower appellate courts affirmed the trial
court's decision.90
In reversing the New York Court of Appeals,91 the United States Su-
preme Court held that there are certain "kaleidoscopic"92 situations where
"concern[s] for public safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal
language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda."93 While agree-
ing that the facts fell within the ambit of Miranda,94 the Court reiterated that
stitutional rights, ask questions essential to elicit information necessary to neutralize the threat to the
public.").
79 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651-52.
80 Jd at 652.
81 d
82 Jd
83 Jd
84 Jd
85 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652.
86 Jd
87 Jd
88 Jd
89 Jd at 652-53.
90 Jd at 653.
91 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651.
92 Jd. at 656.
93 d at 653.
94 The Court acknowledged that Quarles was in police custody when the questioning took place. New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984).
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the "prophylactic Miranda warnings . . . are 'not themselves rights protect-
ed by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected."'95
According to the Court, when police officers are confronted with an im-
mediate necessity of discovering and neutralizing a danger to the public or
themselves, officers are given the latitude to ask questions reasonably
prompted by that safety concern before giving Miranda warnings.96 The
majority reasoned that if officers were required to administer Miranda
warnings in these situations, suspects like Quarles would be deterred97 from
responding to police questioning98; the lack of response would potentially
pose an increased danger to the public.99 Additionally, officers should not
have to decide between asking questions without Miranda warnings, ren-
dering subsequent probative evidence inadmissible, or administering the
warnings, but possibly weakening their ability to obtain that evidence and
eliminate the threat.100 Thus, the exception is meant to not "second-guess"
the on-scene judgment of the police, which allows the officers to follow
their "legitimate instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger
to the public safety."101
In the dissent's opinion, the facts of the case failed to show that there
was any risk to the public during Quarles's interrogation102-prior to the in-
terrogation, Quarles had been reduced to a condition of physical powerless-
ness,103 there were no facts that would suggest Quarles ever had an accom-
plice,104 and the store was apparently deserted except for some store clerks
at the checkout counter. 105 In creating a public safety exception, there will
inevitably be disagreements over the scope of the public safety exception
and mistakes in its application;106 the end result will be "a firespun new doc-
trine of public safety exigencies incident to custodial interrogation, com-
95 Id at 654 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
96 See id at 656.
97 In that case, Quarles was eventually read his Miranda rights, but in fact waived those rights and con-
tinued to answer the officer's questions. Id. at 652.
98 See id at 657.
99 Id (the Court hypothesized that an accomplice or customer might find the gun).
100 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657-58.
101 Id. at 659.
102 Id. at 675 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103 Jd
104 Jd
105 Id. at 676 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
106 For analysis concerning the scope of the exception and the circuit split on the issue, see generally
Rorie A. Norton, Note, Matters of Public Safety and the Current Quarrel Over the Scope of the Quarles
Exception to Miranda, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2010).
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plete with the hairsplitting distinctions that currently plague our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence."107 In referring back to Miranda, the dissent ar-
gued that the majority incorrectly applied a "judicial balancing act," weigh-
ing the social utility over a prophylactic rule. 108
According to the dissent, the majority failed to account for the fact Mi-
randa was a decision concerning coerced confessions, not public safety:
"Without establishing that interrogations concerning the public's safety are
less likely to be coercive than other interrogations, the majority cannot en-
dorse the public safety exception and remain faithful to the logic of Miran-
da v. Arizona."O9 Moreover, the public safety exception would invite po-
lice officers to coerce defendants to make incriminating statements and
permit the government to introduce those statements at trial; allowing this
would be a departure from the principle that coerced confessions are inad-
missible in criminal prosecutions.110
Presently, the continued legitimacy of the Quarles public safety excep-
tion is at issue, given the Court's decision in Dickerson:111 "If one looks at
how the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination
has been applied outside the interrogation context, one finds that the Su-
preme Court 'ordinarily does not balance the government's interest in ob-
taining information against the individual's interest in avoiding compul-
sion.' The latter interest prevails."112 However, it seems as though the
public safety exception announced in Quarles will prevail in light of Dick-
erson. To justify the continued applicability of the public safety exception,
a court will most likely hang its hat on Justice Rehnquist's opinion that
Quarles "illustrate[s] the principle-not that Miranda is not a constitutional
rule-but that no constitutional rule is immutable."113
However, some Justices have stated their disagreement over recognizing
the Quarles public safety exception in light of Dickerson.114 In response to
107 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 680 (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at 663-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
108 Id. at 681.
109 Id. at 684.
110 See id. at 686.
111 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).
112 DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 488; see also Jeffery Standen, The Politics of Miranda, 12 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 563-64 (2003) (recognizing that if Miranda was a constitutional decision, then
the Quarles public safety exception would violate the Fifth Amendment, and thus be unconstitutional).
113 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441. But see id. at 445-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court has the pow-
er, not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful 'prophylac-
tic' restrictions upon Congress and the States. That is an immense and frightening antidemocratic power,
and it does not exist.").
114 See id. at 455 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist's statement, above, Scalia stated:
The issue . . . is not whether court rules are "mutable"; they assuredly are. It is
not whether, in the light of "various circumstances," they can be "modifi[ed]";
they assuredly can. The issue is whether, as mutated and modified, they must
make sense. The requirement that they do so is the only thing that prevents this
Court from being some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or
thumbs-down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its collective
fancy.115
Justice Scalia wrote that if confessions "procured in violation of Miranda
are confessions 'compelled' in violation of the Constitution," then the post-
Miranda line of cases, including Quarles, "do not make sense."116
III. COURTS' ENCOUNTERING THE EXCEPTION'S EXTENSION
A. The Extension Approach
i. The Ninth Circuit
In United States v. DeSantis,117 the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide
whether the Quarles public safety exception applies to a situation in which
an accused has asserted his right to counsel. The court noted that this was a
case of first impression that required the determination of whether the un-
derlying considerations of Quarles called for a relaxation of the "procedural
safeguards enunciated in Edwards . . . ."118
On September 13, 1985, two inspectors went to Defendant DeSan-
tis's apartment to execute an arrest warrant.119 After entering the living
room and identifying themselves as U.S. marshals, one inspector cursorily
searched DeSantis, while the other conducted a brief security sweep of the
apartment. 120 The inspectors then read DeSantis his Miranda rights, and
DeSantis asked to call his attorney. 121 When he was told he would be going
to court, DeSantis asked if he could change his clothes.122 In response to
DeSantis's request, one inspector asked whether there were weapons in the
115 Jd
116 Jd
117 United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1989).
118 d
119 Jd at 537.
120 Jd
121 Jd There was some dispute over whether DeSantis actually asked to speak with his attorney. For
purposes of the decision, the court adopted DeSantis's version of events. Id. at 538 n.1.
122 Id. at 537.
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bedroom, to which DeSantis responded, "there was a gun on the shelf in the
closet." 123 The inspectors escorted a non-handcuffed DeSantis to the bed-
room and seized the gun from the closet shelf.124 DeSantis sought to sup-
press both the gun and his statements but failed in both attempts. 125 Both
the gun and the statements were admitted in a bench trial, and the district
court found DeSantis guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm.126
In upholding DeSantis's conviction, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the
Edwards rule typically requires police officers to cease interrogation when
the suspect has expressed a desire to speak with counsel;127 however, certain
exigencies require the relaxation of rules that act as "prophylactic safe-
guards," including the Edwards rule.12 8 According to the court, the ra-
tionale underlying the exception to providing Miranda warnings also allows
the police to continue questioning a suspect after he invokes his right to
counsel: "Society's need to procure the information about the location of a
dangerous weapon is as great after, as it was before, the request for coun-
sel."129 When faced with a threat to public safety, an officer's questions are
motivated by the need to secure either his own or the public's safety and not
to elicit testimonial evidence.130 Because the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the marshal's questions fell within the broadening scope of the public safety
exception, a court should disregard the "Edwards prophylactic rule" and in-
stead focus on whether the statements were coerced.131 Having found that
DeSantis's statements were not coerced, the court held that both the gun
and the statements were properly admitted at trial.132
ii. The Fourth Circuit
In United States v. Mobley,133 the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the
Ninth Circuit's decision in DeSantis in considering whether the Quarles
public safety exception should be extended to situations where Miranda
rights have been given and a suspect has invoked his right to counsel.
123 DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 537.
124 Jd
125 Jd
126 Jd
127 Jd at 538 fn. 2.
128  d. at 540-41.
129 DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 540-41.
130 Jd
131 d.
132 Jd
133 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1129 (1995).
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In Mobley, approximately eight F.B.I. specials agents arrived at Defend-
ant Mobley's house to execute both a valid arrest warrant and search war-
rant. 134 When Mobley opened the front door, it was readily apparent to the
agents that he was unarmed, given that he was naked.135 After conducting a
security sweep of the apartment, Mobley was allowed to get dressed under
surveillance.136 Upon returning to the living room, Mobley was formally
arrested, read his Miranda rights, and he invoked his right to counsel.137
One of the agents then asked Mobley if there were any weapons in the
apartment, to which he responded that there was a weapon on one of the
closet shelves in the bedroom.138 Mobley's motion to suppress the state-
ment in violation of Miranda and its progeny was denied, and he was sub-
sequently convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm.139
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that, in the absence of some exception,
the Edwards rule would require a court to suppress Mobley's statement. 140
In dicta, after considering the reasoning advanced in the DeSantis decision
(that the danger persists regardless of a suspect's invocation of his right to
counsel),141 the court held that the Quarles public safety exception applies
to an Edwards situation.142 A majority of the court recognized that the pub-
lic safety exception should be construed narrowly, and applies "only where
there is 'an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public
from any immediate danger associated with [a] weapon."'143
While the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit about the excep-
tion's extension to Edwards, given the facts of the case, 144 the court found
134 Id at 690.
135 d
136 d
137 d
138 Id at 691.
139 Mobley, 40 F.3d at 691.
140 d
141 d
142 Id at 692. While some commentators refer to the Fourth Circuit's statements in Mobley, pertaining
to the public safety exception's extension, as a holding because the Fourth Circuit ultimately held that
the evidence was admissible via inevitable discovery, and the facts did not fall within the public safety
exception, the court's opinion concerning the exception's extension has been criticized as obiter dictum.
Compare Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, What Circumstances Fall Within Public Safety Exception to
General Requirement, Pursuant to or as Aid in Enforcement of Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, to Give Miranda Warnings Before Conducting Custodial Interro-
gation-post-Quarles Cases, 142 A.L.R. FED. 229, 252 (1997), iwith People v. Zanini, No. F038571, 2003
WL 103464, at *6 fn. 3 (Cal. Ct.. App. Jan. 10, 2003).
143 Id. at 693 (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984)).
144 Id. at 692 ("There is nothing that separates these facts from those of an ordinary and routine arrest
scenario. There was no explanation at any time as to what extraordinary circumstances prompted this
[the agent's] question [about the existence of weapons], and we must conclude that there were none.")
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there was no "'immediate need' that would validate protection under the
Quarles exception in this instance." 145 According to the Fourth Circuit, in
the absence of an "objectively reasonable concern for immediate danger to
police or public," the court must follow the Edwards rule.146 Despite the
Edwards violation, the court affirmed Mobley's conviction because the gun
would have been inevitably discovered given the agents' search warrant,
and the introduction of Mobley's statement was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. 147
iii. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
In Trice v. United States,148 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
following in the footsteps of the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, held that the
public safety exception applies after a suspect invokes his right to counsel,
and statements made by the suspect are admissible under the exception.149
In that case, a shooting victim identified Defendant Trice as a suspect al-
legedly involved in an attempted armed robbery.150 Four days after the in-
cident, a detective arrested Trice at his home pursuant to a warrant. 151
While effectuating the arrest, the detective saw Trice's mother and several
small children.152 The detective transported Trice to the police station,
where he was read his Miranda rights and booked.153
After Trice invoked his right to counsel, the detective spent the next
twenty minutes asking him questions about his personal background.154 The
detective then asked, "I'd like to know where the shotgun is. There are lit-
tle kids in the house. I don't want anyone to get hurt."155 Trice responded,
"It's okay. I gave it back to the person I borrowed it from."156 Despite the
fact that the detective waited over an hour to ask about the location of the
gun,157 the trial court ruled that the question and response were admissible
145 Mobley, 40 F.3d at 693.
146 Jd. (emphasis added).
147 Jd at 693-94.
148 Trice v. United States, 662 A.2d 891 (D.C. 1995).
149 Jd. at 892.
150 Jd
151 Jd
152 d
153 d
154 Trice, 662 A.2d at 892.
155 Jd
156 Jd
157 d
2013] 365
366 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVI:ii
under the public safety exception.158
In deciding whether the Quarles exception applies to Edwards, the D.C.
Court of Appeals relied on the reasoning applied by the Ninth Circuit in
DeSantis.159 Agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, the court held that the excep-
tion could logically be extended to situations where a suspect has invoked
his right to counsel for the "straightforward reason that the danger does not
abate with Miranda warnings and assertions. Very simply, there is no tem-
poral relationship between the ongoing exigency and the timing of a Miran-
da refusal."160
Thus, as long as the officer's question was attributed to an "objectively
reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate dan-
ger associated with [a] weapon," a suspect's response would be admissible
as evidence at trial.161 The court concluded that the detective's question
was "reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety," and was
properly admitted at trial.162
B. The Non-Extension Approach
i. The Appellate Court of Illinois
In People v. Laliberte,163 the Appellate Court of Illinois declined to ex-
tend the public safety exception to situations where a suspect has immedi-
ately and unambiguously invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.164
Despite this, the court found that the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination alone does not provide a constitutional right to counsel inde-
pendent of Miranda's procedural safeguards.165
In Laliberte, an armed abductor kidnapped a one-year-old child, placed
him in a duffel bag, left him in a wooded area, and demanded a ransom
158 Jd. at 896.
159 Jd. at 895.
160 Trice, 662 A.2d at 895.
161 Jd. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 n.8 (1984)).
162 Jd at 896 (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656) (noting the "strong circumstantial evidence"- the vic-
tim was wounded with a shotgun, Trice was identified by the victim as a suspect, the shooting took place
one block away from Trice's residence, and the detective had no evidence that the shotgun had been
taken to someplace other than Trice's home - the court concluded that the detective's belief that the
weapon may be located somewhere in the home where several children were present was "objectively
reasonable").
163 People v. Laliberte, 615 N.E. 2d 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
164 d at 817
165 d
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from his family later that same day.166 After making several telephone calls
to the child's home, the defendant directed the child's father to three loca-
tions before the father left the money at a mailbox on an island in a shop-
ping center. 167 While under FBI surveillance, the defendant retrieved the
money on his motorcycle.168 He then led the officers on a high-speed chase
before being bumped from his motorcycle by an officer's squad car. 169
While on the ground, officers demanded that the defendant reveal the lo-
cation of the missing child, to which the defendant responded, "Fuck you, I
want a lawyer."170 The defendant was handcuffed, placed in a squad car,
and subjected to "intense questioning" by one of the FBI agents. 171
Throughout the interrogation, the defendant repeatedly asked for an attor-
ney. 172 After approximately forty minutes of custodial interrogation, the de-
fendant agreed to direct the police to the woods where he left the child ear-
lier that morning.173 Later that evening, the child was found alive lying
outside of the duffel bag.174
The defendant sought to suppress the statements made during the initial
interrogation concerning the whereabouts of the child.175 The motion was
denied, and the statements were introduced at trial.176 The defendant was
subsequently convicted of aggravated kidnapping for ransom. 177
In their efforts to decide whether or not to apply the Quarles public safe-
ty exception,178 the court examined a Wisconsin case179 concerning a child
kidnapping.180 Although the court recognized the similarity of facts and
Wisconsin Court of Appeal's persuasive analysis in applying the public
safety exception,181 the court simply declined to apply the Quarles public
safety exception for Illinois state criminal matters, or its extension to Ed-
166 d
167 Jd
168 d
169 Lahberte, 615 N.E.2d at 817.
170 Jd
171 Id
172 Jd
173 d
174 Lahberte, 615 N.E.2d at 817.
175 Jd. at 817.
176 d
177 I
178 Jd. at 820, 822-23 (the court agreed with the government in principle concerning lllinois's ac-
ceptance of the Quarles public safety exception but declined to apply the exception in this case).
179 Jd. at 816 (citing State v. Kunkel, 404 N.W.2d 69 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)).
180 See Laliberte, 615 N.E.2d at 820-821.
181 d
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wards, thereby skirting the issue of whether there should be an extension
altogether. 182 Like many pre-Dickerson decisions, the court acknowledged
the difference between a violation of a constitutional right and a prophylac-
tic rule, as well as the applicability of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine in such situations.183
ii. The California Fifth District Court of Appeal
In the unpublished opinion of People v. Zanini,184 the California Fifth
District Court of Appeals held that police questions concerning the location
of a dangerous weapon after the suspect had invoked his Miranda right to
counsel violated Edwards, and thus the statements should have been inad-
missible at trial;185 however, the court's reasoning for the non-extension of
the exception attached a peripheral concern.
In that case, Defendant Zanini stabbed the victim in the abdomen.186
While in an ambulance but still at the scene, the victim identified Zanini as
the person who stabbed him.187 The next day, Zanini was arrested, taken to
the local police department, and read his Miranda rights.188 Zanini invoked
his right to counsel, at which point the officers stopped their initial interro-
gation. 189
Given the presence of blood evidence at the crime scene, Zanini was
transported to a medical center to have blood drawn.190 Prior to taking the
blood sample, an officer informed Zanini that several witnesses saw him
stab the victim with an object.191 After voicing his concern over a young
182 Jd. at 820, 822-23. (in dicta, the court acknowledged that the Quarles opinion addressed the narrow
issue of police questioning without administering Miranda warnings, while the case at hand dealt with
questioning after a suspect's invocation of his right to counsel, raising the question of whether the invo-
cation of one's right to counsel is a constitutional right or a prophylactic procedural rule. According to
the court, the federal constitution "affords a right to counsel only by way of the Miranda procedural
safeguards" and "an exception to those safeguards would be viable.").
183 Id. at 818-19. (according to the court, "where the police violate the prophylactic rules developed in
Miranda, but do not actually violate the defendant's fifth amendment [sic] privilege against self-
incrimination, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine will not be applied to exclude physical or testimo-
nial evidence derived from the defendant's statements.").
184 People v. Zanini, No. F038571, 2003 WL 103464 at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003).
185 Id. at * 1.
186 Id. at *2.
187 Jd
188 Id. at *3.
189 Jd
190 Zanini, 2003 WL 103464 at *3.
191 Jd.
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child or innocent bystander finding the dangerous weapon and injuring
himself, an officer asked Zanini where the object was located. 192 Zanini
stated that he did not want to incriminate himself.193 When the officer reas-
sured Zanini that "it was just for matters of public safety," Zanini told the
officer that the knife was located "on top of a church."194 Zanini then de-
scribed the characteristics of the knife and directed the officer to the loca-
tion where he discarded the knife.195 The officer subsequently found a knife
on the top of the roof that matched Zanini's description.196 Both the knife
and Zanini's statements were admitted at trial, and Zanini was convicted of
attempted murder and assault with a dangerous weapon. 197
In addition to examining both the Edwards rule and the Quarles public
safety exception,198 the court addressed the holdings in DeSantis, Mobley,
and Trice.199 While acknowledging that there may be situations where in-
admissible statements under an Edwards violation would nevertheless be
admissible because of the public safety exception,200 the court concluded
that the exception did not warrant the admission of Zanini's statements. 201
According to the court, when the officer stated "it was just for matters of
public safety," the officer impliedly represented that Zanini's statements
would not be introduced at trial for incrimination purposes. 202 The officer's
implied representation is the direct opposite of the part of Miranda warn-
ings that "anything you say can and say will be used against you in a court
of law."203 Hesitant to provide officers the incentive to explicitly or implic-
itly negate portions of the Miranda warnings, the court held that the admis-
sion of Zanini's statements made after he had invoked his right to counsel
were in violation of Edwards.204
192 d
193 d
194 d
195 d
196 Zanini, 2003 WL 103464 at *3.
197 Jd at *1.
198 Jd at *4-5.
199 Jd at *6-7.
200 Jd. at *7.
201 Jd
202 Zanini, 2003 WL 103464 at *3, *7.
203 Id at *7, (citing People v. Memro, 905 P.2d 1305 (Cal. 1995)); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 479 (1966).
204 Id. at *7.
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IV. ENDORSING A NON-EXTENSION APPROACH
A. A Better Approach to Non-Extension: How and Why Both Approaches
Got It Wrong
Under both approaches addressed in this article, the courts gave too little
deference to the narrow language of the Quarles opinion.205 The United
States Supreme Court in Quarles, while acknowledging that the decision
might cause problems concerning the clarity of Miranda,206 created a "nar-
row" exception to Miranda.207 That narrow exception only allows police
officers to question suspects in custody without reading them their Miranda
rights when there is an immediate danger to the public or the officers.208
Although the Court recognized that officers would inevitably encounter
"kaleidoscopic situation[s],"209 there is no language in the Quarles decision
that would imply that exception applies after a suspect invokes his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel.210 Quarles should be thought of as only creat-
ing an exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be administered
prior to custodial interrogation, not to the substantive rights articulated in
Miranda.
While the Quarles text itself fails to support the Extension Approach, the
Extension Approach adopted the Quarles reasoning. The lower appellate
courts recognized that the "prophylactic" nature of Miranda would suggest
a logical extension of the public safety exception to situations where a sus-
pect has invoked his right to counsel.211 It is readily apparent that if Miran-
da is merely prophylactic, then it would be rational, given the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Quarles, that the exception could be applied to an Ed-
wards-type situation.212
That being said, all of the Extension Approach cases mentioned in this
article were decided pre-Dickerson.213 According to the Court's opinion in
205 While Alobley recognized that Quarles was a narrowly written decision, it ignored that Quarles was
narrowly written only as an exception to the reading of Miranda rights and not the Miranda opinion as a
whole. See Mobley v. United States, 40 F.3d 688, 692-93 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1129
(1995).
206 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984).
207 Jd
208 Id. at 653, 656.
209 Id. at 656 (referring to the varying types of danger that the officers may confront).
210 See generally id. at 649.
211 See Trice v. United States, 662 A.2d 891, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Mobley v. United States, 40 F.3d
688, 692 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1989).
212 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
213 Dickerson was decided in 2000, while DeSantis was decided in 1989, Aobley was decided in 1994,
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Dickerson, Miranda was not prophylactic, but a constitutional decision.214
Even if the public safety exception survives Dickerson, because the Quarles
Court based its holding on the nonconstitutional, prophylactic nature of the
Miranda warnings, 215 courts in the future cannot use that same reasoning to
substantiate the extension of the public safety exception to Edwards.
The Extension Approach also failed to distinguish the importance be-
tween a police officer informing a suspect of his Miranda rights, and a sus-
pect's invocation of those rights. Miranda warnings merely inform the sus-
pect of his constitutional rights;216 invoking those rights demonstrates that
the suspect already possesses some knowledge about his rights, and wishes
to exercise them. According to the Court, it is a "significant event" when a
suspect invokes his right to counsel.217 By invoking that right, the accused
expresses his intention to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.218 As the Miranda Court wrote,
any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than
the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to
overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once
invoked.2 19
If officers were given the ability to continue their interrogation of a sus-
pect after invocation, they would essentially be compelling a suspect to
forego his previous decision not to incriminate himself, much more coer-
cive than manipulating a suspect who has not been read his Miranda rights.
This surely cannot be what the Fifth Amendment or the public safety excep-
tion meant to allow.
Aside from the legal reasoning, DeSantis, Mobley, and Trice represent
cases of bad facts making bad law.220 In both DeSantis and Mobley, the
facts do not seem to even implicate the public safety exception.221 In these
and Trice was decided in 1995.
214 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
215 Quarles, 649 U.S. at 654.
216 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
2 17 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474); see supra note 64
and accompanying text.
218 Miranda, 484 U.S. at 473-74.
219 Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
220 See supra Part III.A. But cf Jim Weller, Comment, The Legacy of Quarles: A Summary of the Pub-
lic Safety Exception to Miranda in the Federal Courts, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 1107, 1115 (1997) ("DeSan-
tis should be viewed as a case of bad facts making good law."). See generally Trice v. United States, 62
A.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. De-
Santis, 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
221 Compare Mobley, 40 F.3d at 693 (holding the public safety exception did not apply to the facts of
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two cases, officers secured the premises and the defendants were under po-
lice surveillance. 222 In neither of the cases were there extraordinary circum-
stances that would prompt the officers' questions about the presence of
weapons. 223 There is nothing that would separate the facts of DeSantis and
Mobley from that of a run-of-the-mill, routine arrest situation.
The facts of Trice came close,224 but again, the court should not have ap-
plied the exception. In Trice, the officer arrested the defendant at his
home.225 Knowing that a shotgun was used in the crime for which the de-
fendant was arrested, and witnessing small children at the defendant's resi-
dence, the officer could have instinctively inquired into the whereabouts of
the weapon. 226 Part of the Quarles rationale for admitting statements in re-
sponse to questioning about matters of public safety is to avoid second-
guessing the on-scene judgment of a police officer about the timing of the
Miranda warnings.227 It seems as though the instincts of the arresting of-
ficer would have given rise to reasonably prompted questions concerning
the location of the shotgun while at the residence. Instead, the officer wait-
ed approximately an hour after the arrest to ask about the gun. 228 The de-
fendant had already been booked, read his Miranda rights, and invoked
those rights.229 Extended temporal proximity would suggest that the danger
might not have been immediate for purposes of the public safety exception.
Additionally, in all three cases under the Extension Approach the police
read the suspects their Miranda rights.230 The Quarles Court feared that the
police might be less likely to keep the public safe if suspects are advised of
their Miranda rights.231 While there could inevitably be times when not ad-
vising an accused of his rights is constitutionally permissible,232 once the
decision has been made to read the suspect his Miranda rights, the exercise
of those rights must be respected.233
the case), with DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 541 (concluding the public safety exception did apply to the facts
of the case).
222 Mobley, 40 F.3d at 690; DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 537.
223 See Part III.A.
224 Mobley, 40 F.3d at 693; see also supra Part III.A.
225 Trice, 62 A.2d at 892-93.
226 See id at 892.
227 Id.; see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
228 Trice, 662 A.2d at 896.
229 Id. at 893.
230 DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 538; Mobley, 40 F.3d at 690; Trice, 662 A.2d at 892.
231 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
232 See Part II.C.
233 But see DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 541 (holding the public safety exception applied, even after the sus-
pect asserted his Miranda rights); Trice, 662 A.2d at 896.
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The only substantive argument put forth by the Extension Approach is
that the immediacy of the danger does not change just because a suspect in-
vokes his right to counsel.234 Thus, as long as the officer's questions are at-
tributed to an objectively reasonable need to protect the public or the police
from an immediate danger, a suspect's statements made in response to those
questions should be admissible in the government's case-in-chief.235 If a
court were to adhere to the Edwards rule, the police would have to engage
in a balancing test, which the Quarles Court felt was unreasonable.236 But,
as aptly stated by Justice O'Connor,
Miranda had never been read to prohibit the police from asking questions to
secure the public safety. Rather, the critical question Miranda addresses is who
shall bear the cost of securing the public safety when such question are asked
and answered: the defendant or the State. Miranda, for better or worse, found
the resolution of that question implicit in the prohibition against compulsory
self-incrimination and placed the burden on the State. 237
There seems to be a visceral, misconceived notion associated with the
suppression of evidence as the remedy for a Miranda-Edwards violation; if
the evidence will be suppressed, that means the police cannot question the
suspect further after invoking the right to counsel. And if officers are una-
ble to question the suspect, the harm will inevitably persist, possibly caus-
ing even greater harm. However, such postulations should not exist within
a vacuum. The harm need not persist merely because the law requires sup-
pression. Police officers can continue their questioning of the suspect, us-
ing their learned skills of interrogation, and elicit information from the sus-
pect needed to extinguish that harm. According to the Court's plurality
opinion in United States v. Patane, if the police obtain physical evidence as
"fruit" of this Miranda-Edwards violation, it need not be suppressed at tri-
al.238 As pointedly stated by Justice Marshall in his Quarles dissent, "[a]ll
the Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced statements at
trial."239
234 See DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 540-41; Mobley, 40 F.3d at 692-93; Trice, 662 A.2d at 895.
235 See DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 540-41; Mobley, 40 F.3d at 692-93; Trice, 662 A.2d at 895.
236 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657-58.
237 Id. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
238 542 U.S. 630, 638 (2004) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Scalia).
239 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Returning to the hypothetical presented in the Introduction of this arti-
cle, 240 the suspect's fate appears relatively determined. If a court does not
extend the Quarles public safety exception after a suspect invokes his right
to counsel, then the officer's questions were in violation of Edwards. At
trial, the suspect's statements about the gun's location should be suppressed
in the government's case-in-chief. However, pursuant to Patane, the gun
found in the empty cartons of the supermarket would most likely be admis-
sible at trial.
B. Further Extension and The Public Safety Exception's Practicality
Despite the narrow construction of Quarles, Dickerson's
(re)constitutionalization of Miranda, and the difference between the admin-
istration of Miranda warnings and invoking Miranda rights, if a court con-
cludes that the public safety exception applies to Edwards, there would be
far-reaching negative policy implications. While reluctant to employ a
"slippery-slope" argument, the exception's extension would cause greater
harm to the fundamentals of constitutional law than acknowledged by both
the Extension and Non-Extension Approaches in Part III.
What if, instead of invoking his right to counsel, a suspect unambiguous-
ly invokes his right to remain silent? 241 If the Quarles public safety ex-
ception applies to Edwards v. Arizona, then should the exception not also
apply to Michigan v. Mosley?242
According to Miranda and Mosley, when a suspect invokes his right to
remain silent, custodial interrogation must cease.243 However, this does not
mean the police cannot reinitiate interrogation. In Mosley, the Court held
that "the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has
decided to remain silent depends on whether his 'right to cut off question-
ing' was 'scrupulously honored."'244 As long as the suspect's right to re-
main silent was "scrupulously honored," police officers may reinitiate cus-
240 The fact pattern is based principally on the facts of New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984),
modified slightly to incorporate the central issue addressed in this paper.
241 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
452, 459 (1994), in which the Court applied the "unambiguous" requirement of asserting the right to
counsel to situations in which a suspect invokes their right to remain silent.).
242 423 U.S. 96 (1975); see also Trice v. United States, 662 A.2d 891, 894-95 (D.C. 1995) (hinting that
the public safety exception will also apply under circumstances where a suspect has invoked his right to
remain silent).
243 See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 100-01 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)).
244 Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
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todial interrogation.245
If the public safety exception were extended to situations where a suspect
has invoked his right to remain silent, officers could intentionally violate
both Miranda and Mosley; they need no longer "scrupulously honor"246 a
suspect's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right. As previously addressed
in this article, when one exercises his Miranda rights, he is intending to ex-
ercise his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination.247 If a court were to provide the police the extreme latitude
to pressure a suspect into making incriminating statements after his invoca-
tion of the right to remain silent, the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination would be eviscerated.
If a court were to allow the police to violate Edwards and Mosley under
the guise of public safety, what constitutional guarantees, if any, would ever
survive the exception? Where will the line be drawn in the name of secur-
ing the public? If officers can continue custodial interrogation after a sus-
pect invokes his rights, what other techniques may they use to obtain infor-
mation?248
Given two recent terrorist attacks, both concerns for national security and
the Quarles public safety exception are in the spotlight of public debate.249
President Obama's legal advisors, including Attorney General Eric Holder,
have proposed allowing the government to permit interrogators to withhold
Miranda warnings from terrorism suspects for lengthy periods:250 "The
goal . . . would be to open a window of time after an arrest in which inter-
rogators could question a terrorism suspect without an interruption that
might cause the prisoner to stop talking."251
In practice, however, such concerns are merely theoretical and mis-
placed. As a suspect in the attempted Times Square car bombing, Faisal
Shahzad was questioned by the F.B.I. without being read his Miranda
245 Jd.
246 Jd
247 See Miranda, 484 U.S. at 473-74.
248 Compare Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 203 (2004), with Alan M. Dershowitz,
The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 275 (2004), and John T.
Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option, 63 U. PITT.
L. REV. 743 (2002).
249 See Peter Baker, A Renewed Debate Over Suspect Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010,
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/nyregion/05arrest.html?_r-1&emc-etal.
250 Charlie Savage, Proposal Would Delay Hearings in Terror Cases, N.Y. TIMES , May 14, 2010,
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/15/us/politics/ 5miranda.html?_r=1&emc-etal.
251 Jd.
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rights.252 While Shahzad was eventually read his rights after the F.B.I. de-
termined that there was no continuing threat, Shahzad chose to voluntarily
waive those rights and continue talking.253 Despite conservative criti-
cism,254 Democrats stated that "the Shahzad case dispels the idea that con-
stitutional protections need to be tossed aside in cases of terrorism."255
In the case of the "underwear bomber," Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was
also questioned under the public safety exception.256 Like Shahzad, Ab-
dulmutallab also chose to waive his Miranda rights and continue providing
information to authorities.257 Even Eric Holder observed that "the giving of
Miranda warnings has not stopped these terror suspects from talking to us.
They have continued to talk even though we have given them a Miranda
warning."258 These cases illustrate that terror suspects are not necessarily
dissuaded from talking with officers when read their Miranda rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Assuming that the Quarles public safety exception survives Dickerson's
constitutional "clarity" of Miranda, its continued applicability should only
warrant police officers to question suspects to neutralize an imminent threat
to public safety without administering Miranda warnings. The exception
should not be extended to Edwards.
In declining to extend the public safety exception, courts should appreci-
ate the narrowly written opinion of Quarles. The Court only created an ex-
ception to the requirement that officers administering Miranda warnings
prior to custodial interrogation when there is an immediate danger to the
public or the police.259 Neither the language of the opinion260 nor the
prophylactic reasoning used in its creation261 allow courts to justify exten-
sion.
252 d
253 Peter Baker, A Renewed Debate Over Suspect Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010,
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/nyregion/05arrest.html?_r-1&emc-etal
254 Jd.
255 Id. (Representative Adam Smith (D-WA): "We have proven in this country for a long, long time that
you can get very valuable information out of people after you Mirandize them.").
256 Emily Berman, You Still Have the Right to Remain Silent, CNN OPINION (June 2, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-02/opinion/Berman.Miranda.supreme.courtImiranda-waming-
miranda-protections-umar-farouk-abdulmutallab?_s=PM:OPINION.
257 d
258 d
259 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984).
260 d
261 Id. at 658.
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Courts should also take into account the difference between the police in-
forming a suspect of his rights and the suspect invoking those rights. Once
a suspect has exercised the "significant event"262 of invoking his right to
counsel, officers must abide by the Edwards rule; the police must cease all
custodial interrogation until an attorney has been made available to the sus-
pect. 26 3 Adherence to this rule does not mean that police officers are pre-
vented from continuing their custodial interrogation of the suspect, but only
that any statements made by the suspect in violation of Edwards should be
deemed inadmissible in the government's case-in-chief.264 The Miranda
Court held that this burden falls squarely on the shoulders of the State.265
Were Quarles to apply to Edwards, the exception's extension could be
expanded even further. A suspect's right to remain silent would no longer
be respected if there was an immediate danger to the public; this would be
in clear opposition of what the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was meant to prevent. The Court established a bright-line rule
concerning a suspect's right to counsel in Edwards266 and, for the reasons
provided in this article, lower courts should adhere to it.
262 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474
(1966)).
263 Id. at 485.
2 64 New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990).
265 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)).
266 Edhards, 451 U.S. at 484.
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